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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the relationship between
éducation, taxation, and labour mobility. Today's tax revenues finance the
formation of tomorrow's human capital through éducation policies. A be-
nevolent government aims at maximizing social welfare, not the stock of
human capital- High tax rates are not only conducive to a very high level
of human capital but also to poor consumption standards and low levels of
social welfare. In a closed economy the government faces a simple trade-off
between current consumption and resources devoted to the formation of the
skills that will serve to produce tomorrow.
When labour is mobile in a two-country world increasing tax rates
to implement a more ambitious éducation policy leads to labour émigration
and a shrinking tax base, and may ultimately resuit in lower levels of human
capital and welfare. On the other hand, immigrants are taxpayers; immigra
tion enhances human capital formation in the receiving country and is likely
to irnprove its welfare. This paper is an attempt to clarify the tradeoffs at
work when tax and éducation policies are linked internationally through
labour mobility.
For that purpose I construct a very simple overlapping générations
model in which individuals migrate to the country offering the most favou-
rable net income. In each country labour income is taxed and tax revenues
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serve to finance public éducation expenditures. I allow myself a bunch of
drastic simplifications : the migration décision is the only one faced by in-
dividuals ; fertility is exogenous and labour mobility does not affect birth
rates; labour supply is inelastic. Importantly, I assume that governments'
behaviours are not stratégie.
Much attention has been paid to the adverse conséquences of labour
émigration for the sending country. This stream of research known as the
"brain drain" literature points out that those left behind may be worse off
and eventually supports the idea of a brain tax levied on emigrants to com-
pensate those left behind for the welfare loss (see Bhagwati and Hamada
(1982)). Brain drain usually results in a double externality : négative for
those left behind and positive for the receiving country. Unlike the brain
drain approach the model developed in this paper assumes that ail indivi-
duals are endowed with the same country-specific level of human capital. It
thus relates to a récent stream of literature which emphasises the intertem
poral aspects of human capital formation in the patterns of labour migration
(e.g., Galor and Stark (1994), Prenkel and Razin (1996), Mountford (1997),
Vidal (1998)).
The migration of persons raises conceptual issues related to the défi
nition of each country's social welfare function. Who is going to count in the
social welfare function of the sending country ? How to define the social wel
fare function of the receiving country ? My aim is not to examine différent
types of social welfare function. I shall take the view of temporary migration
according to which emigrants are part of the social welfare calculus of their
country of origin. The welfare gain of emigrants can thus compensate for the
potential welfare loss of those left behind. This view is consistent with the
démographie assumption of the model according to which a new génération
is born in each country in each period, the size of which is not affected by
the location choice of the previous period. My modelling does not distin-
guish migrants' consumption from potential remittances aimed at financing
the consumption of temporary migrants' families (including offspring) who
are left behind in their home country.
The focus of the paper is the public finance aspects of éducation po-
licies. It is clearly related to the fiscal compétition literature. Emigration
brings about welfare gain through higher foreign wages but may restilt in
a lower tax base, and therefore impinge on the sending country's éducation
policy. According to the résidence principle of taxation (see Prankel and Ra
zin (1996)) emigrants pay taxes in their host country, not in their country
of origin. Governments' tax policies affect both the location of labour and
the formation of human capital. Since individuals can avoid heavy taxes by
emigrating the shape of the government's revenue resembles a Laffer curve.
Human capital formation exhibits decreasing returns to scale with respect
to public spending on éducation in each country so that each economy con
verges to a steady-state level of human capital; this assumption is consistent
with the empirical évidence for diminishing social returns to human capital
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that diminishing returns with respect to public spending on éducation play
in determining the welfare conséquences of labour mobility. Its main resuit
is that émigration can improve the long-run welfare of the sending country
when the elasticity of the éducation technology is low : the loss in human ca
pital formation stemming from labour émigration is offset by the emigrants'
welfare gain. Welfare improvement can not resuit when this elasticity is too
high. As far as the receiving country is concerned, immigration provides
higher tax revenues and results in a higher level of human capital than au-
tarky. Immigration can nevertheless resuit in a level of welfare lower than
autarky.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
assesses the effect of éducation policies on both human capital formation
and welfare. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
I consider a two-country overlapping générations world. In each coun
try production occurs according to a linear technology using only one input,
human capital. Technologies differ across countries and the world economy
thus consists of a high and a low wage country (w* ^ w). I first consider
the benchmark case of a closed economy. Second, I deal with the migration
décision faced by individuals under openness. Third, I examine human ca
pital formation in both the receiving and the sending country and study the
dynamics of the economy.
2.1 Benchmark case : closed economy
Individuals live two periods. When young they are educated ; when
adult they supply inelastically their accumulated human capital ht+± on
the labour market, and receive a net income ht+iw(l — rt+i) where w is
the wage rate and Tt+i the tax rate on labour income. Consumption occurs
only during adulthood so that the individual's budget constraint is : ct+i =
ht+iw (1 — rt+i). For simplicity I assume a linear utility function, u (c) = c,
to get
u (ct+i) = ht+iw (1 - Tt+i)
The population consists of a continuum of identical individuals. A conve-
nient normalisation is that the size of each génération is equal to 1.
In this very simple setting private individuals do not face any économie
choice. The government décides on éducation policy. Human capital forma
tion is financed through taxation. In period t the tax revenues, Tt = whtrt.
are spent on the éducation of the génération born at t. The éducation tech
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Figure 1 : The closed economy (w = 5;b = 0.4,)
on éducation :
ht+i =
where b G ]0,l[ is the tax revenue elasticity of the éducation technology.
The éducation technology exhibits diminishing returns with respect to tax
revenues as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992); this type of technology is in
the spirit of Barro (1990)'s model of government spending. An equilibrium is
a séquence {ht,ct,Tt) that satisfies ct = w (1 — ht)rt and ht+i = (whtTt) ,
where the path of tax rates (rf) is exogenous. For a stationary level of
taxation, r, the long-run level of human capital is :
h = (wt) (1)
I now characterise the optimal stationary path (see de la Croix and Michel
(2000)) that maximises the stationary utility under the stationary resource
constraint of the economy. This should be seen as a dynamic problem of
allocating resources between consumption and human capital formation.
The stationary level of welfare associated with a tax r is :
WA = hw{l - t) = (1 - t)
The optimal stationary tax, r, is the solution to :
Ô\nWA
1-t 1-6 r
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Hence: ^ h x
t = b and WA = (1 — 6)èTri;^Ttrî
A tax increase always enhances human capital formation. However, the le-
vel of human capital is not the only variable according to which one has
to appraise économie welfare. High taxes also resuit in a low share of con-
sumption in GNP and hence lead to poor standards of living. There is a
trade-ofF between resources devoted to human capital formation and private
consumption. The steady-state level of welfare is maximised when the tax
rate equals the tax revenue elasticity of the technology of éducation (see.
for example, figure 1 where the optimal tax rate is 0.4).
2.2 The migration décision
I now turn to the two-country model. Throughout this paper I shall
dénote the variables of the receiving country with an asterisk. The return
to human capital is higher in the receiving country : pt = ™*f{~_J^) ^ 1 •
I assume that the sending country's tax rate is comprised between 0 and
1 ; the receiving country's tax rate can therefore vary between 0 and 1 —
^r (1 - n) < 1. This amounts to assume that the high (low) wage country
is an immigration (émigration) country.
Individuals boni in the low wage country can avoid taxation by emi-
grating. When adult individuals face the following choice : they can either
work at home and earn a net income ht+iin (1 — Tt+i) or emigrate and earn
ht+i'W* (l — Tt*+i)- The utility of an individual who décides to work in his
country of origin is thus given by :
u(ci+\) = ht+iw{l -rt+i)
I assume that migrants incur a mobility cost. One unit of income abroad
brings as much satisfaction as (i (fi G [0,1]) units of income at home (see
Mirrlces (1982)). The utility of an emigrant is given by :
u (ct+i) = fJ.ht+iw* (1 - rf*+1)
I further assume that the psychological migration cost is uniformly dis-
tributed on [0,1] among individuals in each génération. The individual i,
characterised by a migration cost fx%, emigrates if and only if:
u \ct+i) — u [ct+i J ^ l) ^ /i ^ Pt+i
Hence the share of emigrants in the population is:pt+i = 1 — pt+i- It is
straightforward to computc the impact of an increase in either the sending
or the receiving country's tax rate on the flow of migrants. Lower taxes in
the receiving country encourage labour migration as do higher taxes in the
sending country.378 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 66(4), 2000
2.3 Dynamics of human capital formation and steady
state
Human capital formation is fînanced through a tax on labour income.
Emigrants thus contribute to the formation of human capital in their host
country, not in their country of origin.
The sending country : Per capita human capital evolves according to :
ht+i = ((1 - Pt) htWTt)b = {ptrthtw)b (2)
The receiving country : The receiving country levies taxes both on its
own citizens and immigrants. Per capita human capital evolves according
to:
K+i = ((^t +Ptht)w*rnb = «K + (1 - Pt)ht)w*Tt*)b (3)
Consider now that tax rates are constant across time (rt = r, rt* = r* ;
pt = p). (2) and (3) define a two-dimensional first order dynamical System.
Définition A steady state equilibrium of this economy is a pair of levels of
human capital (h, h*) solving (2) and (3) with h*t+1 = h^ and ht+1 = ht.
Proposition The economy converges towards a unique steady (h,h*).
Proof : Let me dénote with Dt the ratio of both countries' levels of human
capital, ht/ht. I Divide (3) by (2) to obtain the law of motion of Dt :
(4)
A steady-state ratio of both countries' levels of human capital solves :
G(D) = Dl'b -(D + l-p) (^11.) = 0 (5)
\ WT p J V '
where. by assumption, r €]0,1[ and r* € ]0.1 - ^-(1 - r) [. I hâve :
WT p
G"(D) = L(L-i\ D^b~2 > 0
Since (^(O) < 0 and G"(+oo) > 0 there exists a unique D e]0,+oc[ such
that : D < D & G'(D) < 0. Hence G is a decreasing function of D on 10, D \
n *** r
and an increasing function of D on D, +oo .Jean-Pierre Vidal 379
Since (7(0) < 0 and Uni G(D) = +00, there exists a unique D 6
D—» + DO
]0,+oo[ such that G{D) = 0. According to (2) the steady-state level of
human capital in the sending country is
li={prw)^ (6)
and the level of human capital in the receiving country is : h* = Dh.












3 Assessing the impact of éducation policies
What are the effects of éducation policies on both the sending and the
receiving country ? Are the adverse effects of high taxes dominated by the
benefits of government spending on éducation ? The level of human capital is
not the yardstick of welfare. Governments hâve to balance the positive effects
of human capital formation with the négative effects that heavy taxes hâve
on consumption. In tins model there is an intergenerational trade-off since
those who pay taxes are différent from those who benefit from éducation
expenditures. I nevertheless allow myself a drastic simplification by only
considering steady-state welfare.
First, I characterise the impact of labour mobility on human capital
formation. Second, I asscss the steady-state welfare conséquences of labour
mobility.
3.1 Effect on human capital formation
3.1.1 The sending country
Let me first assess the short and long-run impacts of an increase in
the domestic tax on human capital formation. Tins results in two opposing
effects. On the onc hand. higher taxes increase the amount of resources
devoted to human capital formation. On the other hand. higher taxes resuit
in higher émigration. I obtain :
dht+i ht+i dh b 1 - 2r
(1 - 2tv.) and — = -— -h
ot 1 b r(l r)
n &r:r (1 2tv.) and =
OTt Tt{l-Tt) ot 1 — b r(l - r)380 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 66(4), 2000
Increasing taxes enhances human capital formation in the short and the
long run if the tax rate is less than 1/2. The short and long-run efFects of
an increase in the foreign tax on domestic human capital are positive :
dht+i ht+i dh b 1
Q „ = b T > 0 and -^— = -—-- h > 0
drl 1 - rt* dr* 1 - b 1 - r*
The prospect of paying higher taxes abroad discourages natives to emigrate
and thus increases the domestic tax base.
3.1.2 The receiving country
What is the short-run impact of an increase in either the domestic
or the foreign tax rate on the formation of human capital in the receiving
country? In the short run an increase in the sending country's tax rate
enhances human capital formation in the receiving country. Immigrants pay
taxes in their host country but are educated in their country of origin;
higher taxes in the sending country both encourage émigration and improve
emigrants' level of human capital. Differentiating équation (3) gives :
>
In the short run an increase in the domestic tax rate results in two oppo-
sing effects. On the one hand, workers pay higher taxes; on the other hand,
the number of taxpayers shrinks since higher taxes render the country less
attractive for potential migrants :
(h' ïW£ + i w 1~Tt w HahL\
Can the tax base effect dominate the tax level erfect ? The tax level efFect
dominâtes whenever
hl w \ — Tt w (1 —Tj)rt* _
ht " w* 1 - ri w* (1 - rlf ~
Let me recall that rt* G ]0,1 — ^-(1 — rt)]. I hâve :
F 1-—U-